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PLAINTIFF PERSONAL JURISDICTION  
AND VENUE TRANSFER 
Scott Dodson* 
Personal jurisdiction usually focuses on the rights of the defendant. This is 
because a plaintiff implicitly consents to personal jurisdiction in the court 
where the plaintiff chooses to file. But what if the defendant seeks to transfer 
venue to a court in a state in which the plaintiff has no contacts and never 
consented to personal jurisdiction? Lower courts operate on the assumption 
that, in both ordinary venue-transfer cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and 
multidistrict-litigation cases under § 1407(a), personal-jurisdiction concerns 
for plaintiffs simply do not apply. I contest that assumption. Neither statute 
expands the statutory authorization of federal-court personal jurisdiction. 
And theories based on implied consent stretch that notion too far. Personal 
jurisdiction legitimately can treat plaintiffs and defendants differently, but 
those differences call for nuance and fact dependency, not a blanket exemp-
tion for plaintiffs from personal-jurisdiction protections. This Essay reestab-
lishes plaintiff-side personal jurisdiction by articulating and justifying the 
standard for protecting the due process rights of plaintiffs subject to interstate 
venue transfer without their express consent. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After a twenty-five-year hiatus, personal jurisdiction is once again in the 
limelight.1 The Supreme Court’s return to the doctrine coincides with the 
increasing mobility of cases in modern federal litigation, as parties attempt—
with judicial encouragement—to use venue-transfer statutes to move cases 
across state lines.2 
The intersection of personal jurisdiction and venue transfer has generat-
ed issues before. In Hoffman v. Blaski, for example, the Court held that ven-
ue transfer to a court that lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
was improper.3 But Congress amended the general venue-transfer statute to 
allow transfer to a court that otherwise would lack personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant if the parties consent to the transfer.4 Further, the Court has 
held that a transferor court lacking personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
may transfer the case to a court that has personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant.5 Throughout the development of the law at the intersection of per-
sonal jurisdiction and venue transfer, the focus has been on personal juris-
diction’s protection of defendants.6 
But what about plaintiffs? Personal jurisdiction protects them too.7 In 
most cases, the personal-jurisdiction protections for plaintiffs can be easily 
 
 1. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); BNSF Ry. 
Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014); Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 
(2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (general venue transfer); id. § 1407(a) (multidistrict liti-
gation (MDL) transfer); Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49 (2013) (allow-
ing venue transfer based on a contractual forum-selection clause); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, 
Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67, 72 (2017) (reporting that nearly 40 
percent of the federal courts’ civil docket is MDL transfers). 
 3. 363 U.S. 335 (1960). 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
 5. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 465–67 (1962). 
 6. The leading treatise on federal practice, in its section on venue transfer, does not 
even discuss personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs (though it does identify cases on the issue in 
footnotes). See 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3845 
(4th ed. 2018). 
 7. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985) (“The Fourteenth 
Amendment does protect ‘persons,’ not ‘defendants,’ however, so absent plaintiffs as well as 
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sidestepped because a plaintiff effectively consents to the personal jurisdic-
tion of the court where the plaintiff files.8 But what if the case is whisked out 
from under the plaintiff to a remote destination in a faraway state, against 
the plaintiff’s choice and without the plaintiff’s consent? To date, neither 
courts nor commentators have satisfactorily interrogated the personal-
jurisdiction implications for plaintiffs in such a context.9 Yet the problem is 
a prevalent one, for such venue transfer occurs in a sizable percentage of fed-
eral cases.10 
In this Essay, I make two contributions to the issue of personal jurisdic-
tion over plaintiffs in venue-transfer cases. First, I hope to force off the blin-
ders and shine a light on the real and serious nature of the issue. The issue 
should not be ignored or sidestepped but confronted and duly considered. 
Second, I offer an approach for addressing the issue. Although personal ju-
risdiction does protect plaintiffs in venue-transfer cases, the application of 
the consent doctrine depends upon a deeper consideration of the unique 
posture of plaintiffs. I therefore illustrate some paradigmatic circumstances 
for when and how personal jurisdiction protects plaintiffs in venue-transfer 
cases by restricting the range of transferee courts. 
I. THE BASICS 
Personal jurisdiction is a due process right not to be subject to the adju-
dicatory authority of a sovereign.11 Although the theory behind personal ju-
risdiction is unsettled,12 the Court has made clear that personal jurisdiction 
exhibits both sovereignty and fairness features.13 The sovereignty features 
help restrain states from adjudicating the rights and obligations of citizens of 
 
absent defendants are entitled to some protection from the jurisdiction of a forum State which 
seeks to adjudicate their claims.”). 
 8. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938). 
 9. The few courts to consider the issue have offered perfunctory analyses that do not 
withstand scrutiny, as explained in more detail below. See infra Part II. Academic papers have 
essentially ignored the issue; the two lone exceptions are three pages in Andrew D. Bradt, The 
Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1165, 1222–24 (2018) (arguing 
that Shutts does not alleviate concerns of personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs in MDL trans-
fers), and two pages at the end of David E. Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer and the Interests 
of Justice, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443, 516–17 (1990) (arguing, based on plaintiff protection 
and defendant symmetry, for the application of the minimum-contacts test for plaintiffs in the 
transferee court). Cf. Joan Steinman, Reverse Removal, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1126–27 (1993) 
(arguing that state-based personal jurisdiction should protect plaintiffs whose state cases are 
moved involuntarily across state lines under a proposed intersystem consolidation regime). 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 20–21. 
 11. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 879 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
 12. Compare id. at 880–81 (plurality opinion) (framing personal jurisdiction as a doc-
trine of consent), with id. at 900–01 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (framing personal jurisdiction as 
a doctrine of reasonableness and fairness). 
 13. See William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH. 
L. REV. 1205, 1212–20 (2018) (exploring this dichotomy). 
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other states.14 And the fairness features help justify or guard against the bur-
dens parties face when forced to litigate outside of their home states.15 These 
constitutional norms set the outer bounds of personal jurisdiction; sover-
eigns can further restrict their courts’ adjudicatory authority by statute.16 
Among the parties to a lawsuit, these features of personal jurisdiction 
tend to operate by protecting defendants, who are involuntary parties sub-
jected to the initial forum choice of the plaintiff. Plaintiffs understandably 
may wish to avoid the defendant’s home state for strategic reasons; they may 
even select a forum that is purposefully inconvenient for the defendant. And, 
as the filing party, the plaintiff has that initial power of forum selection. As a 
result, the overwhelming body of cases and commentary on personal juris-
diction has focused on its applicability to defendants. 
But the Due Process Clauses protect “persons,” not just defendants,17 so 
plaintiffs arguably have similar entitlements to the protections of personal 
jurisdiction. In most cases, consent obviates any protections: the plaintiff’s 
act of filing a complaint in a court manifests the plaintiff’s consent to the 
personal jurisdiction of that court for purposes of resolving the claims as-
serted in that complaint.18 The Supreme Court has held that the plaintiff’s 
filing-based consent also extends to consent to personal jurisdiction regard-
ing counterclaims asserted by the defendant against the plaintiff in the same 
case in the same court.19 In essence, the plaintiff consents to the personal ju-
risdiction of the court whose jurisdiction the plaintiff invoked. 
That much is settled law. Things get fuzzy, however, if the case is trans-
ferred to a different state without the plaintiff’s consent and the plaintiff 
would not otherwise be subject to personal jurisdiction in the transferee 
state. Such venue transfers are common. The two most prominent transfer 
mechanisms are by court order under 28 U.S.C. § 1404—the general venue-
transfer statute—for the convenience of the parties and in the interests of 
justice,20 and by order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
 
 14. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780–81 (2017) 
(reasoning that the “federalism interest may be decisive” and holding it so in a case involving 
out-of-state plaintiffs suing an out-of-state defendant for out-of-state injuries). 
 15. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–16 (1987) (explain-
ing and applying the fairness factors, resulting in a denial of personal jurisdiction). 
 16. See, e.g., Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961) 
(discussing the restrictions of the state long-arm statute). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 18. Debra Lyn Bassett, Class Action Silence, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1781, 1790 (2014) (“In non-
class litigation, personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff is resolved through a perfunctory appli-
cation of the doctrine of consent: by electing to sue the defendant in that particular forum, the 
plaintiff thereby is deemed to have consented to the court’s power to issue a judgment that will 
bind her.”). 
 19. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938). 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
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(JPML) under 28 U.S.C. § 1407—the MDL-transfer statute.21 In those cir-
cumstances, the plaintiff is subjected, against their will, to the adjudicatory 
authority of a new court whose jurisdiction the plaintiff did not invoke. Do 
personal-jurisdiction protections for the plaintiff impose limits on such 
transfers? In my view, the answer is unequivocally yes. 
II. A CRITIQUE OF CURRENT APPROACHES 
I have found almost no academic literature on the question of how per-
sonal jurisdiction applies to plaintiffs subject to involuntary interstate venue 
transfer,22 though, as I document below, commentators seem to assume that 
personal jurisdiction does not apply to such plaintiffs. The Supreme Court 
likewise has not addressed the issue. A few lower courts have confronted the 
issue, but they tended to rely on perfunctory rationales to conclude that per-
sonal jurisdiction over plaintiffs is not of concern in venue-transfer cases. 
The Sections in this Part address these rationales and expose their weakness-
es. 
A. Personal Jurisdiction’s Applicability to Plaintiffs 
Some courts take the position that plaintiffs, as voluntary party-
claimants, are simply not subject to the protections of personal jurisdiction, 
even in venue-transfer cases.23 Murray v. Scott,24 the leading district-court 
case espousing this view, reasoned as follows: 
The minimum-contacts concerns inhere when a party is haled into court 
without its consent upon pain of a default judgment. These concerns are 
not present when a plaintiff is forced to litigate his case in another forum. 
Barring a counterclaim, plaintiff will not have judgment entered against 
him in the new forum; even with a counterclaim, plaintiff chose to initiate 
litigation enabling the counterclaim. In no sense is plaintiff unilaterally be-
ing haled into court to defend. Indeed, plaintiff’s original choice of forum is 
preserved in at least one way: the law of the transferor forum will govern in 
the litigation rather than the law of the new forum. Therefore, the Interna-
tional Shoe minimum-contacts analysis is not necessary. The requirement 
that a litigant have minimum contacts with the forum simply does not exist 
for an ordinary plaintiff.25 
 
 21. Id. § 1407(a). Multidistrict litigation has increased dramatically as class actions have 
declined. See Bradt, supra note 9, at 1168 (asserting that MDL has become the “centerpiece of 
nationwide mass tort litigation”); Burch, supra note 2, at 72 (reporting that MDL cases in-
creased from 16 percent of the federal civil docket in 2002 to 39 percent of the docket in 2015). 
 22. For the few exceptions, see supra note 9. 
 23. See, e.g., Viron Int’l Corp. v. David Boland, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 2d 812, 818 (W.D. 
Mich. 2002) (“A court may lack personal jurisdiction over a defendant, but never over a plain-
tiff, who consents to such jurisdiction by filing suit.”). 
 24. 176 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (M.D. Ala. 2001). 
 25. Id. at 1255–56. 
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In other words, because personal jurisdiction protects involuntary parties 
subject to the coercive power of a court, only defendants are entitled to the 
protections of personal jurisdiction. Some commentators have proffered this 
theory.26 
The position that plaintiffs do not need personal jurisdiction protections 
because of the differences between the risks faced by plaintiffs and defend-
ants is seriously undermined by the availability of the declaratory-judgment 
action, which enables a putative defendant to initiate, as a plaintiff, an action 
seeking a declaration of nonliability against a putative claimant (who be-
comes the defendant).27 Personal jurisdiction applies equally to defendants 
to declaratory-judgment actions, even though such suits effectively present 
no risk of liability to them.28 
In any event, the position represented by Murray v. Scott is evidently 
mistaken after Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, which suggests that personal 
jurisdiction is applicable to plaintiffs: “The Fourteenth Amendment does 
protect ‘persons,’ not ‘defendants,’ however, so absent plaintiffs as well as ab-
sent defendants are entitled to some protection from the jurisdiction of a fo-
rum State which seeks to adjudicate their claims.”29 And, in applying this 
principle, the Court held that the Constitution’s personal-jurisdiction pro-
tections for plaintiffs require certain structural safeguards in class actions.30 
Thus, there is no basis for a blanket exemption of plaintiffs from the protec-
tions of personal jurisdiction. Murray and cases that have followed its rea-
soning are on the wrong track. 
As Shutts hints by using the qualifier “some,” however, personal juris-
diction need not apply with equal strength to all parties.31 Indeed, Shutts it-
self applies a lightened version of personal jurisdiction to plaintiff class 
members because of their unique position as quasi plaintiffs with legally pro-
tected representation in the litigation by the named plaintiffs.32 Shutts thus 
opens the door for other circumstances that might justify a nuanced ap-
proach to the nature of the personal-jurisdiction protection for plaintiffs. I 
endorse that need for nuance and, in Part III, show how it applies to venue 
transfer. The points here, however, are that personal jurisdiction does protect 
 
 26. See Email from Jay Tidmarsh, Judge James J. Clynes, Jr., Professor of Law, Notre 
Dame Law School, to author (Jan. 9, 2018, 10:46 AM) (forwarding a listserv post by Professor 
Stanley E. Cox articulating the position that plaintiffs “don’t have [due process] rights re: 
where the litigation proceeds since they are the potential beneficiaries and originators of the 
litigation”) (on file with author). I recognize that casual postings to a listserv do not always rep-
resent firmly held or deeply considered views, a caveat that applies to infra notes 60, 76, and 
107 as well. 
 27. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012). 
 28. See, e.g., Xilinx, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GmbH, 848 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 29. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985). 
 30. Id. at 808–12. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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plaintiffs to some degree, and that a blanket exemption for plaintiffs is in-
compatible with the Constitution. 
B. Personal Jurisdiction’s Applicability to Temporary Transfers 
The general venue-transfer statute contemplates transfer for all further 
proceedings, including trial and judgment, in the transferee court.33 Such all-
purpose transfer calls for ensuring the adjudicatory authority of the transfer-
ee court, which completely replaces the transferor court’s authority. 
But transfers of multidistrict-litigation cases by the JPML are different. 
With one exception,34 the MDL-transfer statute specifically limits transfer 
“for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings” and directs that 
“[e]ach action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the 
conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was 
transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated.”35 The Supreme 
Court has confirmed that MDL transferee courts cannot try transferred cas-
es.36 
According to the JPML, the personal-jurisdiction analysis in MDL cases 
turns on this temporary, limited-purpose nature of the MDL transfer. The 
prevailing argument in MDL transfers is that regardless of whether personal 
jurisdiction applies to plaintiffs as a matter of course, personal jurisdiction 
does not apply to plaintiffs (or defendants, for that matter) when the transfer 
is limited only to a temporary transfer for pretrial proceedings. According to 
the JPML, as long as the transferor court had personal jurisdiction at the 
time the case was filed, MDL transferee proceedings are “simply not encum-
bered by considerations of in personam jurisdiction.”37 
In this way, “the JMPL essentially disclaims that the transferee court is 
exercising personal jurisdiction at all”; instead, personal jurisdiction is con-
fined to the transferor court.38 As the JPML explained: “A transfer under 
Section 1407 is, in essence, a change of venue for pretrial purposes. Follow-
ing a transfer, the transferee judge has all the jurisdiction and powers over 
pretrial proceedings in the actions transferred to him that the transferor 
judge would have had in the absence of transfer.”39 In essence, the JPML’s 
theory is that when transfer is temporary, the transferee court has personal 
 
 33. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012). 
 34. Congress authorized the JPML to “consolidate and transfer with or without the con-
sent of the parties, for both pretrial purposes and for trial, any action brought under section 4C 
of the Clayton Act.” Id. § 1407(h). 
 35. Id. § 1407(a). 
 36. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 34 (1998). 
 37. In re FMC Corp. Patent Litig., 422 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (J.P.M.L. 1976) (per curiam); 
see also In re Library Editions of Children’s Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139, 1141–42 (J.P.M.L. 1969). 
 38. Bradt, supra note 9, at 1172. 
 39. In re FMC Corp., 422 F. Supp. at 1165; see also 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, 
§ 3866 (“The transferee judge inherits the entire pretrial jurisdiction that the transferor court 
could have exercised . . . .”). 
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jurisdiction derived from the transferor court—and that personal-
jurisdiction authority flows through, unchanged, to the transferee court. 
There are both legal and practical problems with this reasoning. The le-
gal problem is that nothing in Supreme Court case law suggests that personal 
jurisdiction is different when the proceedings are temporary and confined to 
pretrial matters. To the contrary, courts adhere to personal-jurisdiction 
principles in contempt proceedings40 and in enforcing discovery matters, es-
pecially against nonparties.41 It is true that the Supreme Court has indicated 
that “[personal] jurisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to issue a 
judgment on the merits” and that a court may dismiss a case on nonmerits 
grounds without confirming personal jurisdiction.42 But that principle has 
not been extended to full pretrial delegation to a different court whose pretri-
al rulings will bind the parties and shape any final judgment. That is for good 
reason: the JPML’s rationale essentially bars any personal-jurisdiction objec-
tion to the decisions of the court that will render significant and important 
rulings in the case. Thus, even if the transferee court does not purport to en-
ter judgment on the merits, personal jurisdiction protects parties from being 
bound by the transferee court’s pretrial rulings. 
The practical problem is that MDL transferee courts can and often do 
enter judgments on the merits; any characterization of MDL transfer as tem-
porary borders on the fictional. As I have noted elsewhere, the promise of 
MDL remand for merits disposition in the original transferor court is a cha-
rade.43 MDL transferee courts decide dispositive motions on the merits of 
 
 40. See, e.g., Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. McLaughlin, 49 F.3d 1387, 1388 (9th Cir. 1995) (revers-
ing contempt order and sanctions for lack of personal jurisdiction). 
 41. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 141 F.3d 337, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“The principle that 
courts lacking jurisdiction over litigants cannot adjudicate their rights is elementary, and cases 
have noted the problem this creates for the prospect of transferring nonparty discovery dis-
putes.”); Ariel v. Jones, 693 F.2d 1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 1982) (upholding the quashing of a sub-
poena for lack of sufficient contacts with the forum); Estate of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 400 
F. Supp. 2d 541, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a party must “make out a prima facie case 
for personal jurisdiction” in order to take “any discovery—even jurisdictional discovery—from 
a foreign corporation”). See generally 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE § 108.125, at 108–48 (3d ed. 2008) (“A nonparty witness cannot be compelled to tes-
tify at a trial, hearing, or deposition unless the witness is subject to the personal jurisdiction of 
the court . . . .”); 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 2454, at 398–99 (3d ed. 2008) (“A corporation is amenable to service of a subpoena under 
Rule 45(b) in any forum in which it has sufficient minimum contacts.”). 
 42. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431–32 (2007) 
(cleaned up); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(i) (allowing personal jurisdiction objections to be de-
ferred until trial). 
 43. Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 35 
(2018) (“But as a practical matter, the pretrial focus, with its implicit promise of remand to the 
transferor court for final disposition, is a charade.”); see also Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore 
Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-
Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1297 (2018) (calling resort to the “temporary” nature of 
MDL a “masquerade[] . . . to get around the limits . . . on a federal court’s personal jurisdic-
tion”). 
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the case, and enter judgment orders like summary judgment, all the time.44 
These merits adjudications undeniably require personal jurisdiction in the 
transferee court.45 Further, these merits dispositions, coupled with the MDL 
transferee court’s power to issue global settlements,46 mean that transfers are 
usually permanent—more than 97 percent of transferred MDL cases are re-
solved by the transferee court.47 The premise that an MDL transfer is for 
temporary pretrial matters that are just a prelude to remand for disposition 
in the transferor court is mistaken. For both legal and factual reasons, then, 
that premise cannot justify ignoring the strictures of personal jurisdiction in 
MDL-transfer cases. 
C. Statutory Authorization of Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction 
In federal courts, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause supplies 
the constitutional authority for personal jurisdiction, and that grant is 
broader than the Fourteenth Amendment’s authority, at least for cases in-
volving domestic parties.48 How much broader is subject to some uncertain-
ty,49 but it seems clear that Congress could, consistent with the Fifth 
Amendment, create a single district for the United States, with nationwide 
personal jurisdiction over all domestic parties.50 If so, personal jurisdiction 
would not limit transfers of federal cases within the United States. 
 
 44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (2012); 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3866; Bradt & 
Rave, supra note 43, at 1297 (“[T]he MDL court has all the powers of the transferor court, in-
cluding the power to grant dispositive motions.”). 
 45. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (stating that personal 
jurisdiction is “an essential element,” without which the court is “powerless to proceed to an 
adjudication”) (quoting Emp’rs Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 382 (1937)). 
 46. Settlements probably obviate personal jurisdiction problems through the consent 
doctrine. Because MDL plaintiffs retain their party status and may reject any global settlement, 
their decision to opt in to a settlement likely manifests consent to the personal jurisdiction of 
the transferee court to bind them to that settlement. But see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judg-
ing Multidistrict Litigation, 90 NYU L. REV. 71 (arguing that transferee judges lack adequate 
jurisdiction to oversee private settlement agreements). I do not mean to suggest otherwise 
here; rather, I mention settlements because they help confirm that MDL transfers are nearly 
always permanent rather than temporary. I note, however, the growing criticism of the enor-
mous pressure placed on MDL plaintiffs to accept transferee courts’ global settlement orders, 
see, e.g., Burch, supra note 2, at 72–73, a pressure that may test the limits of voluntary consent 
to personal jurisdiction. 
 47. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 
339, 400–01 (2014). 
 48. Dodge & Dodson, supra note 13, at 1236–41 (making this point but distinguishing it 
from cases involving aliens); see also Jonathan R. Nash, National Personal Jurisdiction, SSRN 
(Feb. 6, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3119383 [https://
perma.cc/D27E-4ZAD] (arguing that the Fifth Amendment uses a more generous test than the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 49. Dodson, supra note 43, at 34–35 (noting some disagreement among the circuit 
courts about the different tests). 
 50. Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 
1301, 1319–20 (2014) (making this argument). 
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But Congress has instead created discrete districts for the district courts, 
suggesting that, as a legislative default, district courts may exercise personal 
jurisdiction only over their own districts. As the Supreme Court long ago 
wrote: 
The judiciary act has divided the United States into judicial districts. With-
in these districts, a circuit court is required to be holden. The circuit court 
of each district sits within and for that district; and is bounded by its local 
limits. Whatever may be the extent of their jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of suits, in respect to persons and property; it can only be exercised 
within the limits of the district . . . . We think that the opinion of the legisla-
ture is thus manifested to be, that the process of a circuit court cannot be 
served without the district in which it is established; without the special au-
thority of law therefor.51 
Of course, the law has overridden this default by authorizing more expansive 
district-court personal jurisdiction in a number of ways, including through 
service under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and specific 
statutory provisions enacted by Congress.52 But these are authorizations be-
yond a narrower default of district-specific personal jurisdiction in federal 
court.53 
Nevertheless, Congress undoubtedly could give a transferee court per-
sonal jurisdiction over a plaintiff in all cases in which the plaintiff is a U.S. 
citizen or resident or has sufficient national contacts to comport with the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, even if the plaintiff has never had 
any contacts or connections to the transferee court’s district or state.54 The 
question, then, is whether the venue-transfer statutes grant such nationwide 
jurisdiction. 
Some federal courts of appeals have construed the MDL-transfer statute, 
which allows transfer to “any district . . . for the convenience of parties and 
witnesses and . . . [to] promote the just and efficient conduct of such ac-
tions,”55 to provide for just such a grant of nationwide personal jurisdiction. 
 
 51. Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328–29 (1838); see also Robertson v. R.R. 
Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622–23 (1925) (“Under the general provisions of law, a United States 
District Court cannot issue process beyond the limits of the district, and a defendant in a civil 
suit can be subjected to its jurisdiction in personam only by service within the district. Such 
was the general rule established by [Judiciary Act] in accordance with the practice at the com-
mon law. And such has been the general rule ever since.” (citations omitted)); Hagan v. Cent. 
Ave. Dairy, Inc., 180 F.2d 502, 503 n.3 (9th Cir. 1950) (“Before the adoption of Rule 4(f), pro-
cess could issue only within the district in which the court sat.”). 
 52. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k). 
 53. Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 467 (1945) (“Apart from specific exceptions 
created by Congress the jurisdiction of the district courts is territorial.”). 
 54. The statutory authorization might also apply to alien plaintiffs who do not have suf-
ficient national contacts by virtue of the consent doctrine; by filing in a U.S. court, the alien 
would consent to adjudication in the United States, and the nationwide statutory authorization 
would moot the question of which state. 
 55. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). 
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In the words of one court: “The MDL statute is, in fact, legislation authoriz-
ing the federal courts to exercise nationwide personal jurisdiction.”56 These 
courts have gone further to characterize arguments contesting the jurisdic-
tion of MDL transfers as “frivolous”57 or “meritless.”58 
As for the general venue-transfer statute, courts have made a somewhat 
different argument in support of nationwide personal jurisdiction, at least as 
applied to the plaintiff. The general venue-transfer statute has language simi-
lar to the MDL-transfer statute, authorizing transfer to “any other district or 
division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to 
which all parties have consented” based on “the convenience of parties and 
witnesses, in the interest of justice,” without addressing personal jurisdiction 
in any way.59 But rather than construe the statute as an express authorization 
of nationwide personal jurisdiction like the MDL-transfer statute, courts 
have inferred transferee personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff because the 
general venue-transfer statute authorizes transfer without regard to personal 
jurisdiction.60 
The leading case on personal jurisdiction and the general venue-transfer 
statute is In re Genentech, Inc.,61 in which Sanofi, a German company, sued 
two California companies for patent infringement in the Eastern District of 
Texas, a forum without any significant contacts with the parties or claims.62 
The defendants moved to transfer under § 1404(a) to the Northern District 
of California.63 Among other arguments opposing the transfer, Sanofi ar-
gued, and the district court credited, that the Northern District of California 
would lack personal jurisdiction over Sanofi.64 The Federal Circuit, however, 
 
 56. Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 382 F. App’x 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2010) (cleaned 
up); see also In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 163 (2d Cir. 1987) (express-
ing the same sentiment). 
 57. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1432 (2d Cir. 1993), over-
ruled on other grounds by Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002). 
 58. Howard, 322 F. App’x at 442. 
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). A few other courts have attempted to fit plaintiff personal juris-
diction into the language of the statute. See, e.g., Viron Int’l Corp. v. David Boland, Inc., 237 F. 
Supp. 2d 812, 818–19 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (granting a motion to transfer venue under 1404(a), 
despite the lack of personal jurisdiction in the transferee court, because the plaintiff could have 
brought suit there). 
 60. Commentators also have articulated this argument. See Email from Jay Tidmarsh, 
Judge James J. Clynes, Jr., Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School, to author (Jan. 9, 2018, 
10:44 AM) (forwarding a listserv post by Professor Kevin Clermont noting that § 1404(a) “does 
not require the plaintiff’s consent or jurisdiction over plaintiff”) (on file with author). At least 
one commentator also has articulated the argument that the general venue-transfer statute 
does expressly authorize nationwide personal jurisdiction. See id. (forwarding a listserv post by 
Professor Allan Stein suggesting that the statute “authorizes the transferee court to assert juris-
diction over the parties”). 
 61. 566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 62. Id. at 1340–41. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1341. 
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rejected the argument that the Northern District of California must have 
personal jurisdiction over Sanofi: 
We . . . conclude that the court clearly erred. There is no requirement un-
der § 1404(a) that a transferee court have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or 
that there be sufficient minimum contacts with the plaintiff; there is only a 
requirement that the transferee court have jurisdiction over the defendants 
in the transferred complaint.65 
The court engaged in no other analysis of the issue. Its perfunctory reason-
ing mirrors that of a number of district courts that have addressed the ques-
tion,66 in that the lack of a statutory restriction manifests authorization of na-
tionwide personal jurisdiction. 
Constructions of the MDL-transfer statute as express authorization of 
nationwide personal jurisdiction and of the general venue-transfer statute as 
authorization-by-lack-of-restriction cannot withstand scrutiny. The first 
problem is that, in other contexts, Congress authorized nationwide jurisdic-
tion only by using clear jurisdictional terms or the established equivalent of 
nationwide service of process,67 neither of which is present in either transfer 
statute. The language of the statutes says nothing about personal jurisdiction. 
The authorization of transfer to “any district” cannot sensibly be read as an 
express or implied authorization of personal jurisdiction.68 Further, these are 
eponymously venue statutes, which generally operate under—rather than 
 
 65. Id. at 1346 (citing Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1960)). 
 66. See, e.g., Pac. Coast Trailers, LLC v. Cozad Trailer Sales, LLC, No. CV–10–111–EFS, 
2010 WL 2985701, at *2 n.1 (E.D. Wash. July 21, 2010); FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 611 F. 
Supp. 2d 1081, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Murray v. Scott, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1255 (M.D. Ala. 
2001). But see Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 772, 
780 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (acknowledging that some courts rejecting venue transfer rely in part on 
the possibility that the transferee court would lack personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff) (cit-
ing Tape & Techs., Inc. v. Davlyn Mfg. Co., No. Civ.A.SA04CA-1150-XR, 2005 WL 1072169, at 
*4 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2005), and Aerotel, Ltd. v. Sprint Corp., 100 F. Supp. 2d 189, 198 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000)). 
 67. See Bradt, supra note 9, at 1227. Congress has created nationwide personal jurisdic-
tion in a number of other areas. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2012) (Federal Arbitration Act); 15 
U.S.C. § 5 (2012) (Sherman Act); id. § 22 (Clayton Act); id. § 77v (Securities Act of 1933); id. 
§ 77vvv (Trust Indenture Act); id. § 78aa (Securities Act of 1934); id. § 79y (Public Utility 
Holding Act); id. § 80a–43 (Investment Companies Act); id. § 80b–14 (Investment Advisors 
Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (2012) (RICO); 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (2012) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2012) (ERISA); 33 U.S.C. § 921 (2012) (Longshoreman’s Work-
ers’ Compensation Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (2012) (CERCLA); 45 U.S.C. § 362 (2012) (Railroad 
Unemployment Insurance Act). 
 68. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (allowing transfers to “any district . . . . for the convenience of 
parties and witnesses and [to] promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions”); see also 
Bradt, supra note 9, at 1168, 1172 (arguing that the MDL-transfer statute exhibits no textual 
support for nationwide personal jurisdiction); Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and 
Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1189 n.194 
(1998) (same). 
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supplant—the normal limits of personal jurisdiction,69 as the Supreme Court 
recently confirmed in BSNF Railway v. Tyrrell.70 In light of that backdrop, it 
would be odd for Congress to create nationwide personal jurisdiction in a 
venue statute without using clear jurisdictional language, especially for do-
mestic parties who often assert claims based on state law.71 
The second problem is that the state-based scope of personal jurisdiction 
set out in Rule 4(k) does apply to both forms of venue transfer, at least for 
defendants, which is inconsistent with a construction of the statute that sup-
plants Rule 4(k)’s limits with nationwide personal jurisdiction. Rule 4(k) ap-
plies to general venue transfer to protect defendants from transfer to a trans-
feree court that lacks personal jurisdiction over them, as assessed under the 
normal state-based standard of Rule 4(k).72 Rule 4(k) also applies in MDL 
cases. For one, the JPML recognizes that an MDL transferor court must still 
have personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k) and that MDL transfer does not 
“expand the territorial limits” of Rule 4(k).73 For another, plaintiffs cannot 
file directly in the MDL court if the MDL court would lack personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant under Rule 4(k), unless the defendant consents.74 
These Rule 4(k)–based restrictions could not exist were the venue statutes to 
authorize nationwide personal jurisdiction over all parties. And because the 
venue-transfer statutes do not distinguish between plaintiffs and defend-
ants,75 it would strain statutory construction to read them as authorizing 
personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs but not defendants, especially without 
language even mentioning personal jurisdiction. For these reasons, the stat-
utes cannot be read to authorize expanded personal jurisdiction. 
 
 69. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); see also Michael J. Waggoner, Section 1404(a), “Where 
It Might Have Been Brought”: Brought by Whom?, 1988 BYU L. REV. 67, 70 (suggesting that the 
venue-transfer statute was “intended to preserve normal concepts of personal jurisdiction and 
venue”). 
 70. 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1553 (2017) (holding that a statute reading “an action may be 
brought in a district court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, 
or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the 
time of commencing such action” was a venue statute that did not confer personal jurisdic-
tion). 
 71. See Bradt, supra note 9, at 1173. The legislative history of the MDL statute indicates 
that Congress did not consider the implications of personal jurisdiction at all. See id. at 1204 
(“Substantively, there was no discussion among the drafters—or the Congress—about whether 
there were due process-based limitations on the location of the transferee district . . . . There 
was no substantive debate over whether the proposal presented constitutional problems . . . .”). 
 72. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960) (rejecting venue transfer under 
§ 1404(a) because the defendant could not be subject to personal jurisdiction in the transferee 
court); see also id. at 343–44 (holding the prior iteration of § 1404(a) to be subject to normal 
rules of personal jurisdiction). 
 73. In re Library Editions of Children’s Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139, 1142 (J.P.M.L. 1969). 
 74. Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in Multidis-
trict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 763 (2012). 
 75. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (addressing “all parties”); id. § 1407 (referring only to 
“parties”). 
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D. Consent 
Even though personal jurisdiction applies to plaintiffs and the venue 
statutes do not authorize the transferee court to exercise nationwide personal 
jurisdiction, one could argue that plaintiffs consent to personal jurisdiction 
in the transferee court by filing the lawsuit in the first place. In other words, 
perhaps consent supplies the answer to the problem, even if personal juris-
diction otherwise would protect plaintiffs in transfer cases. Some commenta-
tors have proposed such a theory.76 
I think that this theory stretches the idea of consent too far. Personal ju-
risdiction can, of course, be waived or consented to, and consent is exactly 
what justifies the personal jurisdiction of the plaintiff’s chosen court over the 
plaintiff themself.77 A plaintiff who files a lawsuit in a Texas court submits to 
the personal jurisdiction of that court over them for purposes of adjudicating 
their claim, even if the plaintiff lacks any other contacts with Texas.78 I have 
no quibble with that unremarkable application of the consent doctrine of 
personal jurisdiction. 
But it is a significant extension to say that the plaintiff’s consent to per-
sonal jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s chosen court also extends to any other 
court where the lawsuit ultimately may end up.79 Consider a man from New 
Jersey who is injured in New Jersey by a machine manufactured in California 
by a California company and distributed into New Jersey by a New Jersey 
distributor. The plaintiff sues both the manufacturer and the distributor in 
New Jersey state court for state-law claims, and both defendants concede 
personal jurisdiction over them in New Jersey. The case is eligible neither to 
be filed in federal court nor to be removed to federal court because of the 
presence of a nondiverse defendant, the distributor.80 By all expectations, 
this case would be resolved in New Jersey.81 
 
 76. See Email from Jay Tidmarsh, Judge James J. Clynes, Jr., Professor of Law, Notre 
Dame Law School, to author, supra note 26 (forwarding a listserv post by Professor Mary Gar-
vey Algero noting that “[p]laintiffs frequently sue defendants in jurisdictions in which the 
courts would not have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs” and that “the basis for the court being 
able to rule against the plaintiff is that the plaintiff consented to the court’s jurisdiction by fil-
ing and maintaining the suit in that jurisdiction” and surmising that “the argument for juris-
diction after a transfer [would] be plaintiff’s consent”). 
 77. See supra text accompanying note 18. 
 78. Cf. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779–81 (1983) (affirming the 
adjudicatory authority of the court despite the plaintiff’s lack of connection to the court’s 
state). 
 79. See Bradt, supra note 9, at 1234 (stating that consent in such a case “borders on the 
fictional”). 
 80. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (requiring complete 
diversity). 
 81. Of course, it is possible that the New Jersey court could dismiss on forum non con-
veniens grounds, effectively forcing the plaintiff to file a new lawsuit in a different state. But, if 
so, the plaintiff’s refiling in that state would establish clear consent to that state’s personal ju-
risdiction. 
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But what if, six months into the lawsuit, the distributor agrees to a de-
fault judgment and exits the case? The manufacturer now can remove the 
case to federal court82 and then, once there, can move to transfer the case to 
federal court in California based on the convenience of the parties, over the 
objection of the plaintiff.83 The upshot is that the plaintiff filed a case in New 
Jersey state court with no expectation that it could ever be transferred with-
out his consent to California for trial on the merits before a California jury, 
and yet it was. To take the example a step further, perhaps after transfer to 
California, the defendant asserts a significant counterclaim against the plain-
tiff, forcing him to defend against that claim—and the risk of a money judg-
ment—in California. 
I think that consent to personal jurisdiction in California under these 
circumstances cannot be implied from the filing of a nonremovable lawsuit 
in New Jersey. No Supreme Court case supports such an attenuated notion 
of consent. The Supreme Court has extended the consent doctrine in two 
ways,84 but neither justifies blanket consent in transferred cases. 
First, under Adam v. Saenger, the plaintiff consents to their chosen 
court’s personal jurisdiction as to the defendant’s asserted counterclaims in 
that court.85 But Saenger does not extend consent beyond the state in which 
the plaintiff filed.86 Indeed, the language of the Court’s opinion is quite clear 
in its limitations: 
There is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent a state from 
adopting a procedure by which a judgment in personam may be rendered 
in a cross-action against a plaintiff in its courts, upon service of process or 
of appropriate pleading upon his attorney of record. The plaintiff having, 
by his voluntary act in demanding justice from the defendant, submitted 
himself to the jurisdiction of the court, there is nothing arbitrary or unrea-
sonable in treating him as being there for all purposes for which justice to 
the defendant requires his presence. It is the price which the state may exact 
as the condition of opening its courts to the plaintiff.87 
 
 82. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (2012) (allowing removal even though the original case 
was not removable). 
 83. Id. § 1404(a). 
 84. The Supreme Court has also held that plaintiffs can consent to a state’s personal ju-
risdiction ex ante in a valid contract, see Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 
(1991), and I agree that, in such circumstances, the transferee state would have personal juris-
diction over the plaintiff based on contractual consent. This unique circumstance, however, 
has nothing to do with the operation of the venue-transfer statutes generally. 
 85. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67 (1938). For the argument that unrelated counter-
claims should not carry the same implication, see Jon D. Bressler, Comment, Impermissive 
Counterclaims: Why Nonresident Plaintiffs Can Contest Personal Jurisdiction in Unrelated 
Countersuits, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 641 (2016). 
 86. I have found no court of appeals decision intimating that Saenger has any bearing in 
venue-transfer cases. 
 87. Saenger, 303 U.S. at 67–68 (emphases added). 
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Second, the Court allowed a limited “implied consent” to personal juris-
diction in pre–International Shoe cases based on conduct committed by a 
defendant in the forum state.88 But those cases, like Saenger, depend upon 
some conduct by the party in or into the forum state.89 They do not support 
the proposition that the mere filing of a lawsuit in one state implies consent 
to personal jurisdiction in any other state. 
In sum, the doctrine of consent cannot support a blanket extension of 
personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs to transferee courts in different states. 
This does not mean that consent cannot extend to some multistate transfer 
cases. I explain below why it does indeed.90 
III. PATHS FORWARD 
The conclusion that personal jurisdiction protects plaintiffs in venue-
transfer cases leads to three important takeaways. First, courts must confront 
the personal-jurisdiction issue rather than avoid it or assume blindly that it 
is of no concern. Second, this conclusion creates space for the development 
of more nuanced approaches to personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs in ven-
ue-transfer cases, and I stake out some of the considerations for how person-
al jurisdiction applies in those contexts. Third, the ability of plaintiffs to pre-
serve and invoke personal-jurisdiction objections to a transferee court must 
be preserved; I address those mechanics below. 
A. Recognizing the Issue 
The easy takeaway is that courts should avoid the kind of perfunctory 
reasoning that currently dominates their approaches to the issue. It is wrong 
to say, as the district court in Murray did, that personal jurisdiction does not 
apply to plaintiffs because they are not involuntary parties.91 Nor is it correct 
to say, as the JPML has, that personal jurisdiction is wholly irrelevant in cas-
es transferred solely for pretrial matters.92 Nor should courts conclude, as the 
Federal Circuit did in Genentech, that the venue-transfer statutes automati-
cally confer personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff.93 Nor does consent sup-
ply a complete answer to personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs. 
The right path forward is for courts and commentators to confront the 
issue with the seriousness and consideration that it deserves. Personal juris-
diction over the plaintiff applies and presents some protection when the case 
is transferred to a state in which the plaintiff otherwise neither is subject to 
nor has consented to personal jurisdiction. Whether and how personal juris-
 
 88. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). 
 89. For a modern confirmation of this principle, see Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 
(2014). 
 90. See infra Section III.B. 
 91. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 92. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 93. See In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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diction applies depends upon considerations other than blunt exemptions, 
statutory authorization, and consent. 
B. Establishing Standards 
In this Section, I consider two questions. First, even though personal ju-
risdiction applies to plaintiffs subject to involuntary interstate venue trans-
fer, does the doctrine apply with the same scope and force as it does to de-
fendants? Second, do the varied circumstances of venue transfer demand 
close attention for resolving the scope of personal jurisdiction in venue-
transfer cases? I answer yes to both questions. 
1. The Scope of Personal Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs 
Personal jurisdiction applies to plaintiffs, but it need not necessarily ap-
ply with the same scope or force as it does to defendants. In Shutts, the Su-
preme Court acknowledged that the protections of personal jurisdiction 
could apply with less force to absent class members, who are quasi-voluntary 
parties.94 Absent class members need not hire counsel, travel to appear in 
court, or engage in discovery; they do not have the same litigation burdens as 
named parties.95 Further, they are not subject to the kind of money judg-
ments and injunctions that defendants are.96 Based on Shutts, should a simi-
larly lighter personal-jurisdiction doctrine apply to venue-transfer plaintiffs? 
I think not. The principles animating Shutts do not apply to nonclass 
plaintiffs.97 As true parties, nonclass plaintiffs bear the usual litigation bur-
dens and expenses.98 They hire their own counsel, travel to court as parties, 
and engage in pretrial and trial matters. They also are susceptible to the usual 
risk of counterclaims for money judgments or for injunctive relief. The 
availability—even the expectation—of counterclaims99 places ordinary plain-
tiffs at a realistic risk for judgments like defendants, judgments that could be 
rendered in a forum not chosen by the plaintiff. Further, under the Declara-
tory Judgment Act, parties who would ordinarily be styled as defendants can 
act as plaintiffs to sue their prospective claimants for nonliability; this risk of 
liability in such suits actually falls on the plaintiffs.100 And the status of plain-
 
 94. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808–12 (1985). 
 95. Id. at 810. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Bradt, supra note 9, at 1221–24. 
 98. This remains true even though, as others have recognized, MDL plaintiffs can lose 
some control in an MDL proceeding. See Bradt, supra note 9, at 1207; Linda S. Mullenix, Dubi-
ous Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389, 391 (2011); Charles Silver & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: 
Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 131–35 (2010). 
 99. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (compelling certain counterclaims); FED. R. CIV. P. 13(b) 
(making all other counterclaims permissive). 
 100. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
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tiffs as voluntary parties tends, in other contexts, to work in favor of plain-
tiffs on forum questions. Plaintiffs, after all, must take the enormous step of 
initiating an action, and the law usually privileges their particular choice of 
forum as a result101—especially in an era in which the Supreme Court has 
narrowed personal jurisdiction over defendants to restrict the range of 
choices for plaintiffs in the first place,102 and in an age in which defendants 
often use forum-selection clauses to further control forum.103 I see little rea-
son to give plaintiffs less due process protection from unreasonable forums 
selected by the court or other parties through venue transfer.104 Accordingly, 
I think Shutts cannot justify less than the full scope of personal jurisdiction 
to plaintiffs subject to interstate venue transfer. 
2. Applying Personal Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs 
That personal jurisdiction applies with full force to plaintiffs in venue-
transfer cases is not to say that the doctrine results in the same outcome in 
all circumstances. I think a particularly important consideration is consent. 
Although filing the case cannot supply blanket consent to personal jurisdic-
tion anywhere the case ends up, it may manifest consent beyond the state 
where the case was filed. If the plaintiff files a case in federal court in a state 
either lacking serious connection to the lawsuit or otherwise under circum-
stances in which a transfer under § 1404(a) or even § 1406(a) is obvious,105 
then the invocation of federal court under these circumstances could be con-
strued as consent to the expected transferee court’s personal jurisdiction. 
The state-case illustration in Section II.D above presents an extreme ex-
ample where lack of consent is obvious. But in other contexts—some of 
which are quite common—consent to the transferee court’s personal juris-
 
 101. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (allowing venue transfer from the plaintiff’s cho-
sen forum only if convenience and justice support transfer); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 
U.S. 235, 265–66 (1981) (explaining that the plaintiff’s choice of forum is given substantial 
weight in determining whether to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens). Alt-
hough the Supreme Court has undermined those preferences where the plaintiff agrees to a 
different forum in a private contract antedating the litigation, see, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 
138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (enforcing arbitration clauses); Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. 
Court, 571 U.S. 49 (2013) (enforcing forum-selection clauses), those decisions can be seen as 
enforcing the plaintiff’s earlier choice of forum. 
 102. See Dodson, supra note 43, at 23–28. 
 103. See, e.g., David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum 
Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973 (2008). 
 104. Cf. Bradt & Rave, supra note 43, at 1298–99 (arguing that fundamental fairness sup-
plies personal jurisdiction protection for plaintiffs in MDL-transfer cases); Linda S. Mullenix, 
Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs’ Due Process: Implications for Mass Tort Liti-
gation, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 871, 875 (1995) (“[I]f the central due process concern of personal 
jurisdiction derives from the doctrine of res judicata and the binding effects of judgments, then 
the requirements of plaintiffs’ due process in mandatory class actions ought to parallel those 
for defendants.”). 
 105. The applicability of a valid forum-selection clause restricting the agreed-upon forum 
to the transferee court is a possible example. 
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diction may be implied by the plaintiff’s conduct and in light of reasonably 
foreseeable transfers.106 Two scenarios help illustrate this principle. 
In the first scenario, say a plaintiff from California is injured in Arizona 
by a device manufactured by a Texas defendant whose principal place of 
business is in Texas. The device was designed and manufactured entirely in 
Texas. The plaintiff sues the defendant in federal court in Arizona, claiming 
the device had a design defect. No one disputes the injury or the accident. 
The only dispute is whether the defendant is liable for a design defect. The 
plaintiff can reasonably expect the defendant (or the court) to transfer the 
case to Texas, where the defendant is headquartered, where the product was 
designed and manufactured, and where most witnesses are likely to be. To be 
sure, transfer may not happen. But by filing in federal court in these circum-
stances, the plaintiff can reasonably expect the case to end up in Texas and 
should be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction in Texas on 
that basis, even if the plaintiff has no contacts with Texas. 
In the second scenario, say the same accident occurred on the same 
facts, except that there currently is pending in the District of Delaware a 
multidistrict litigation under the MDL statute against the defendant for the 
same design defect, consolidating hundreds of existing cases. The plaintiff’s 
act of filing a case in Arizona that is highly likely to be transferred to the Dis-
trict of Delaware for consolidation in the MDL should be deemed consent to 
personal jurisdiction in Delaware on those facts. 
Myriad variations on these circumstances exist, and some may present 
difficult cases, but the key point I emphasize here is that they should be dealt 
with on grounds of plaintiff consent (or normal minimum contacts) in ways 
that are consistent with the operation of the ordinary precepts of personal 
jurisdiction. And that inquiry will demand appreciation for the nuances of 
the facts and circumstances at hand. The inquiry will be a fact-sensitive one 
governed by the usual rules of personal jurisdiction. 
C. Practicalities 
The remaining issue is how plaintiffs should invoke objections to a 
transferee court’s personal jurisdiction over them. Some have suggested that 
the plaintiff may dismiss the case in the transferee court.107 But I find that a 
perplexing proposition. For one, moving to dismiss seems inappropriate for 
 
 106. The term “reasonably foreseeable” here has a different meaning than in the context 
of specific personal jurisdiction over defendants. Reasonable foreseeability in the defense-side 
personal jurisdiction context focuses on the primary behavior and expectations of parties be-
fore a lawsuit, perhaps without the advice and expertise of counsel. But for plaintiff-side con-
sent based on lawsuit filing, the act is itself initiated by counsel, or by the party acting as their 
own counsel. Thus, the reasonable foreseeability of transfer should be evaluated from a law-
yer’s perspective. 
 107. See Email from Jay Tidmarsh, Judge James J. Clynes, Jr., Professor of Law, Notre 
Dame Law School, to author, supra note 26 (forwarding a listserv post by Professor Mary Gar-
vey Algero noting that “[i]f plaintiff doesn’t consent to jurisdiction by the court to which the 
case has been transferred, plaintiff can dismiss the suit”). 
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plaintiffs because maintaining the lawsuit (absent any counterclaims) is ex-
actly what the plaintiff wants to do. For another, it is unclear what rule 
would authorize such a motion. Defendants typically object to personal ju-
risdiction by way of dismissal under Rule 12(b) or transfer under § 1406, but 
claimants do not have recourse to Rule 12 (except as opponents to a coun-
terclaim),108 and § 1406 only applies to a challenge to the court where the 
case was filed.109 Voluntary dismissal may be available under Rule 41,110 but, 
again, that seems unfair because a dismissal is the antithesis of what the 
plaintiff is pursuing in the case.111 If the plaintiff does not have the oppor-
tunity to voluntarily dismiss as of right—and this is dripping with irony—the 
plaintiff might need the defendant’s consent!112 
Instead of these mismatched mechanisms, I propose that the lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction of the transferee court be considered as part of the transfer 
or retransfer decision. This is analogous to the practice of courts denying 
joinder of plaintiffs under Rule 19 who cannot be joined for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, as opposed to allowing joinder and then forcing those plaintiffs 
into an odd procedural posture of having to assert a lack of personal jurisdic-
tion.113 
Happily, the language of both the general venue-transfer statute and the 
MDL-transfer statute can be read to incorporate consideration of the per-
sonal jurisdiction of the transferee court. Each statute uses the word “may” 
to lodge ultimate discretion in the transferor court.114 And each demands 
that transfer be “just” or “in the interest of justice.”115 I propose that transfer 
to a court that lacks personal jurisdiction cannot be just and that such a 
transfer would be an abuse of discretion. Thus, the plaintiff’s primary oppor-
tunity to invoke personal jurisdiction will be in the transferor court in the 
briefing on the propriety of a transfer order,116 with the remedy for a finding 
of lack of personal jurisdiction being a denial of transfer. 
 
 108. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). Rule 12 applies only when the lack of personal jurisdic-
tion is characterized as a “defense to a claim for relief,” which the plaintiff clearly cannot in-
voke absent a counterclaim. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 
 109. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2012). 
 110. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a). 
 111. I recognize that the remedy of a voluntary dismissal has some parallels to the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens—which the general venue-transfer statute codified for domestic 
cases, see Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49 (2013)—in that a plaintiff 
subject to a forum non conveniens dismissal can always decline to pursue their case in the des-
ignated forum. 
 112. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring consent of all parties for certain voluntary 
dismissals by the plaintiff). 
 113. See, e.g., Maldonado-Viñas v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., 862 F.3d 118, 122–23 (1st Cir. 
2017). 
 114. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1407(a). 
 115. See id. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a), 1407(a). 
 116. Although § 1404(a) appears to permit a district court to transfer a case sua sponte 
without offering pretransfer briefing to the parties, the court should give the parties an oppor-
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If erroneous transfer is made nonetheless, the plaintiff’s timely objection 
to transfer in the transferor court is enough to preserve the issue for appeal 
in the transferee court’s circuit whenever the transfer is within a single cir-
cuit.117 Objection in the transferor court is also sufficient to preserve the is-
sue for appeal when transfer is between circuits for those circuits that allow 
review of out-of-circuit orders.118 
In circuits that hold themselves without authority to review a transferor 
order by an out-of-circuit court,119 or if the transferor court did not offer the 
plaintiff an opportunity to object to or contest the transfer, the plaintiff 
should immediately move, in the transferee court, to retransfer the case back 
to the original transferor court.120 Most circuits have held that the law-of-
the-case doctrine, which usually provides that “when a court decides upon a 
rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in sub-
sequent stages in the same case,”121 does not prevent the transferee court 
from revisiting the personal-jurisdiction determination made by the trans-
feror court.122 The transferee court’s denial of such a motion then would be 
reviewable by the transferee court’s circuit court, with the circuit court em-
powered to order retransfer.123 
 
tunity to be heard before ordering transfer to a court where personal jurisdiction could be chal-
lenged. 
 117. See, e.g., Cioffi v. Gilbert Enters., Inc., 769 F.3d 90, 92–93 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 118. See, e.g., SongByrd, Inc. v. Estate of Grossman, 206 F.3d 172, 178–80 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(reviewing a pretransfer personal jurisdiction ruling made by a district court outside the Sec-
ond Circuit). 
 119. See, e.g., Moses v. Bus. Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1136 (6th Cir. 1991) (“We 
have no appellate jurisdiction over decisions of district courts outside the Sixth Circuit.”). But 
see EEOC v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 188 F.3d 695, 700 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the transferee 
circuit could review a partial summary judgment entered by a § 1404(a) transferor court after 
final judgment in the transferee court). 
 120. Cf., e.g., ESCO Corp. v. Cashman Equip. Co., 65 F. Supp. 3d 626, 630 (C.D. Ill. 2014) 
(granting a plaintiff’s motion to retransfer based on lack of personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant in the transferee court). 
 121. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 506 (2011) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 
U.S. 605, 618 (1983)). 
 122. See, e.g., FDIC v. McGlamery, 74 F.3d 218, 221 (10th Cir. 1996). A higher, clear-
error standard may apply, however, in light of the need to prevent an endless cycle of transfers. 
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816–19 (1988); McGlamery, 74 F.3d 
at 221. 
 123. See In re Carefirst of Md., Inc., 305 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Indirect review of 
the [transfer] order is available by way of a motion to retransfer the case; if the transferee court 
denies that motion, that decision will be reviewable . . . on appeal.”); Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 
735 F.2d 763, 766 (3d Cir. 1984) (“If the transferee district court denied the motion to re-
transfer, the plaintiff could petition the ‘transferee appellate court’ (i.e., the appellate court 
serving the transferee district court) for a writ of mandamus. And, if mandamus failed, and if 
the plaintiff ultimately could appeal from an adverse final judgment in the case, we believe the 
plaintiff could then raise the failure of the district court to re-transfer as grounds for reversal.” 
(citation omitted)). But see Brigham v. Patla, Straus, Robinson & Moore, P.A., 671 F. App’x 
168, 169 (4th Cir. 2016) (refusing to review a retransfer order because it would effectively con-
stitute a review of the transferor court’s original transfer order). 
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The seminal case Hoffman v. Blaski was just such a case, though it in-
volved personal jurisdiction over the defendant.124 There, the case was trans-
ferred from the Northern District of Texas to the Northern District of Illi-
nois under § 1404(a), even though the Illinois court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants at the time the case was filed.125 The plaintiff 
moved to retransfer, but the Illinois court denied the motion.126 The Seventh 
Circuit reversed this decision, finding that retransfer was appropriate, and 
the Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s reversal and remedy.127 
Because transfer orders are interlocutory and not immediately appeala-
ble,128 and because mandamus orders are extraordinarily rare,129 an appeal of 
an erroneous transfer order ordinarily would have to await a final judgment. 
But that is no different from the denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss 
for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12, in which the defendant must 
await final judgment before appealing the personal-jurisdiction ruling. If the 
appellate court agrees that the transferee court lacked personal jurisdiction 
over the plaintiff,130 it can vacate the judgment and remand to the transferee 
court with instructions to retransfer the case back to the transferor court for 
resumption of proceedings there. 
Of course, if the original transferor court refuses to transfer in the first 
place based on the transferee court’s lack of personal jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff, the defendant would be able to, as under current law, appeal any 
adverse judgment rendered against it in the transferor court.131 
 
 124. 363 U.S. 335 (1960). 
 125. Id. at 336–37. 
 126. Id. at 337–38. 
 127. Id. at 344. 
 128. See In re Carefirst of Md., 305 F.3d at 260 (holding that an erroneous transfer order 
was not immediately appealable). 
 129. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (2012) (providing that appeal of an MDL-transfer order may 
only be by extraordinary writ). The only known instance of mandamus being granted against 
the JPML involved its decision to remand cases prematurely. See In re Food Lion, Inc., Fair 
Labor Standards Act “Effective Scheduling” Litig., 73 F.3d 528, 532–33, 532 n.10 (4th Cir. 
1996). For a challenge to MDL’s limited-appeal regime, see Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for 
Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1643, 1663 (2011) (arguing for the expansion of the right to appeal in MDL proceedings). 
 130. The appellate court will review the question of personal jurisdiction either de novo, 
see Chaiken v. VV Publishing Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1025 (2d Cir. 1997), or for clear error, see 
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816–19 (1988). 
 131. Congress may wish to limit appellate review of such refusals to transfer under 
§ 1404(a) as it has in other contexts, including review of MDL-transfer refusals. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407(e) (“There shall be no appeal or review of an order of the panel denying a motion to 
transfer for consolidated or coordinated proceedings.”); cf. id. § 1447(d) (“An order remanding 
a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or other-
wise . . . .”). After all, if the transferor court has proper jurisdiction and venue and proceeds to 
final judgment, there is little benefit to allowing the defendant to appeal to vindicate the sup-
posed “convenience of the parties and witnesses” just to, in effect, redo the entire case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs in venue-transfer cases has long 
been sidestepped. It ought not be. Plaintiffs are entitled to the same person-
al-jurisdiction protections as any other parties. And it is time for courts and 
commentators to treat the issue with the seriousness and sensitivity it de-
serves. 
My proposal to treat personal jurisdiction as offering some protection to 
plaintiffs in venue-transfer cases gives meaning to personal jurisdiction for 
plaintiffs without causing undue disruption to existing practice. In most 
general venue-transfer cases, plaintiffs will have connections to transferee 
states sufficient to give rise to personal jurisdiction there, or they will have 
consented to personal jurisdiction in those states in prelitigation forum-
selection clauses.132 In MDL cases, plaintiffs often will want to consent to 
MDL transfer to take advantage of the consolidation pressures that MDL ag-
gregation affords plaintiffs. For other cases in which plaintiffs are differently 
situated, my proposed analysis for implied consent will often allow transfer-
ee courts to exercise appropriate personal jurisdiction. In the remaining cas-
es, personal-jurisdiction protections will demand that the transfer options be 
duly limited to accommodate the due process rights of the plaintiff. 
  
 
 132. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
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